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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Jonathan Martin II *
Alyssa K. Peters **
Patricia-Anne Brownback ***
Graham Newsome ****
and Aaron Chang*****
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 1 and decisions interpreting Georgia law from June
1, 2019 to May 31, 2020, 2 that affect labor and employment relations for
Georgia employers.
* Equity Partner, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, Macon, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., cum laude, 1991); Mercer University School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992–1994); Administrative Editor
(1993–1994); Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2006 & Supps.). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, Macon, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., 2004); Georgia State College of Law (J.D., 2008). Member, Georgia State Law
Review (2006–2008); Contributing Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins
Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supps.). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.B.A., cum laude, 2013); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014–2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., 2014); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2017). Member, Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015–2017). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***** Associate, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon, Georgia. University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (B.A., 2007); Villanova University School of Law (J.D.,
2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey period,
see W. Melvin Haas III, et al. Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
71 Mercer L. Rev. 137 (2019).
2Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference sources
for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generally THE DEVELOPING
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II. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
A. Vicarious Liability
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts of employees that
are committed within the scope of their employment. 3 To hold an
employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the following two
elements must be established: (1) the employee was acting in furtherance
of the employer’s business; and (2) the employee was acting within the
scope of the employer’s business. 4
In Terry v. Old Hat Chimney, LLC, 5 Matthew Terry (Terry), sued Old
Hat Chimney, LLC (Old Hat) and its employee, Nickolas James Payne
(Payne), “for damages allegedly sustained when a company van driven
by Payne rear-ended Terry’s vehicle.” 6 Terry brought a claim of
negligence against Payne and a claim of vicarious liability through the
doctrine of respondeat superior against Old Hat. Old Hat admitted that
Payne was actually employed at the time of the accident, and that he was
acting within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred. 7
Following this admission, Old Hat then “moved for partial summary
judgment on Terry’s direct liability claim.” 8
In finding that the Cherokee County Superior Court properly granted
partial summary judgment to Old Hat, the Georgia Court of Appeals
largely based its decision on precedent established in Hospital Authority
of Valdosta/Lowndes County v. Fender 9 by the court in 2017. 10 In that
case, the court of appeals held “if a defendant employer concedes that it
will be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if its
employee is found negligent, the employer is entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s [duplicative] claims for negligent

LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed. 2017); BARBRA LINDEMANN & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (C. Geoffrey Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed.
2007); W. Jonathan Martin II et al., Labor and Employment, 2019 Eleventh Circuit Survey,
71 Mercer L. Rev. 1059 (2020); Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA). Accordingly, this Article is not
intended to cover the latest developments in federal labor and employment law. Rather,
this Article is intended only to cover legislative and judicial developments arising under
Georgia state law during the survey period.
3 Charles R. Adams III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 7:2 (2017–2018 ed).
4 Id. at § 7:2.
5 351 Ga. App. 673, 832 S.E.2d 650 (2019).
6 Id. at 674, 832 S.E.2d at 651.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 342 Ga. App. 13, 21, 802 S.E.2d 346, 354 (2017).
10 Terry, 351 Ga. App. at 674, 832 S.E.2d at 651–52.
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entrustment, hiring, training, supervision, and retention.” 11 Thus, the
court of appeals held that since Old Hat admitted that the doctrine of
respondeat superior applied, Fender required the court to hold that
Terry’s claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision was
duplicative of the claim for respondeat superior and must be dismissed. 12
Terry attempted to convince the court to overrule Fender, claiming it
contravenes O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b), 13 Georgia’s apportionment statute. 14
In the case of Centurion Industries, Inc. v. Naville-Saeger, 15 Jeremy
Carter (Carter) worked as a millwright for A-Lert Construction Services,
a division of Centurion Industries, Inc. (Centurion), performing
“shutdown work,” where a factory would shut down for multiple weeks
and Carter would perform maintenance work at the factory during the
shutdown period. Carter would often travel to out of town job sites to
perform work at shutdown locations. Carter eventually was assigned to
a location in Louisiana but requested leave to return to Georgia to take
care of personal matters. Upon returning to Georgia, Carter attempted
to pass a school bus and hit the car in which Naville-Saeger was a
passenger. Carter was found to be driving under the influence of alcohol.
The parents of Naville-Saeger then brought separate actions against
Centurion, which moved for summary judgment on the basis that Carter
was not acting in the course and scope of his employment when the
collision occurred. The Lowndes County State Court denied Centurion’s
motion for summary judgment, and Centurion requested interlocutory
review by the court of appeals. 16
In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals
determined that Carter was engaged in the purely personal matter of
driving to Valdosta while on unpaid leave from work and, therefore, was
not acting in the course and scope of his employment. 17 The majority of
the court’s analysis focused on the applicability of the “special mission”
rule, which is an exception to the general rule that an “employee is
deemed to act only for his own purposes while commuting to or from
work.” 18 Finding that the exception did not apply, the court focused on
the fact that Centurion had not requested Carter to perform any

Fender, 342 Ga. App. at 21, 802 S.E.2d at 354.
Terry, 351 Ga. App. at 674–75, 832 S.E.2d at 652.
13 O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) (2020).
14 Terry, 351 Ga. App. at 674–75, 832 S.E.2d at 652.
15 352 Ga. App. 342, 834 S.E.2d 875 (2019).
16 Id. at 343–44, 834 S.E.2d at 877–78.
17 Centurion, 352 Ga. App. at 347, 834 S.E.2d at 880.
18 Id. at 345, 834 S.E.2d at 879.
11
12
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particular task and that Carter’s acts took place during a time when
Carter was on approved leave. 19
In re In/Ex Systems, Inc. v. Masud, 20 Michael Green (Green) worked
for In/Ex Systems, Inc. (In/Ex) as a technician, primarily in commercial
construction. As Green drove northbound on Interstate 85 on his way to
work, a vehicle suddenly entered his travel lane. Green quickly changed
lanes to avoid a collision, at which time the front driver’s side tire came
off of his vehicle, and struck a vehicle driven by Tahsin Masud’s (Masud)
wife as she was driving southbound on Interstate 85. Green later pled
guilty to driving with unsafe equipment. 21
Masud, representing the interest of his deceased wife and juvenile
daughter who were in the car struck by Green’s tire, brought an action
against In/Ex alleging vicarious liability for injuries incurred in the
accident. 22 “In/Ex filed a motion for summary judgment in both lawsuits,
arguing, inter alia, that Green had not been driving negligently at the
time of the collision.” 23 The Cobb County State Court denied In/Ex’s
motion for summary judgment, which led to In/Ex’s request for review by
the court of appeals. 24
In reversing the finding of the trial court, the court of appeals held
that “Green had no knowledge of any unsafe condition that caused the
tire to separate from the vehicle.” 25 The court also gave credence to the
fact that Green’s passenger, a co-worker, did not notice any issue with
the vehicle. 26 Since Green had no knowledge of any unsafe condition,
which was required to hold In/Ex vicariously liable, the court of appeals
held that the trial court erred in denying In/Ex’s motion for summary
judgment. 27
In re Hernandez v. Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting, Inc. 28
arose out of an incident where Domingo Hernandez (Mr. Hernandez),
husband of the plaintiff, went to the emergency room of Dorminy Medical
Center because he was suffering from chest pain. Dr. John Glenn (Dr.
Glenn) examined Mr. Hernandez and ordered tests. Dr. Glenn later
arranged to transport the decedent to a better equipped hospital. 29

Id. at 347, 834 S.E.2d at 880.
Ga. App. 722, 835 S.E.2d 799 (2019).
21 Id. at 723, 835 S.E.2d at 801.
22 Id. at 722–24, 835 S.E.2d at 800–01.
23 Id. at 723–24, 835 S.E.2d at 801.
24 Id. at 722, 835 S.E.2d at 800.
25 Id. at 726, 835 S.E.2d at 802.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 726, 835 S.E.2d at 802–03.
28 352 Ga. App. 838, 835 S.E.2d 787 (2019).
29 Id. at 839, 835 S.E.2d 789.
19

20352
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During the trip to the other hospital, “the decedent went into cardiac
arrest and was pronounced dead upon arrival.” 30
Hettie Sue Hernandez filed a complaint against Dr. Glenn and
Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting, Inc. (Schumacher), claiming
medical malpractice and wrongful death. Schumacher successfully
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dr. Glenn had never been
its employee or agent and was instead an independent contractor of Ben
Hill Emergency Group, LLC, which provided emergency department
staffing and management services to Schumacher. 31
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Ben Hill County Superior
Court’s holding. 32 In fact, the court held that Schumacher was a holding
company and had never had any employees or agents. 33 Because there
was no legal relationship between Dr. Glenn and Schumacher, it was not
possible to impose vicarious liability on Schumacher. 34 Furthermore, no
employment contract existed between Dr. Glenn and Schumacher. 35
In Avis Rent A Car System, LLC v. Johnson, 36 Brianna Johnson
(Johnson) was seriously injured when she was struck by a sport utility
vehicle that had been stolen from Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC’s (Avis)
car rental lot in downtown Atlanta. Johnson sued Avis, Avis Budget
Group, Inc., and Peter Duca, a regional security manager for Avis Budget
Group, as well as CSYG, Inc. (CSYG), the operator of the downtown Avis
location, and Yonas Gebremichael (Gebremichael), CSYG's owner. After
a jury trial, the jury awarded Johnson $7 million in damages, despite
finding CSYG and Gebremichael not liable. 37 “Avis filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict [JNOV] or, in the alternative, for
a new trial as to liability.” 38 The Gwinnett County State Court denied the
motion for JNOV but granted a new trial as to liability. Avis appealed
the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
“Johnson appeal[ed] the grant of Avis's motion for a new trial on the issue
of liability.” 39
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the denial of Avis's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 40 The court largely based its

Id.
Id. at 839–40, 835 S.E.2d at 789.
32 Id. at 846, 835 S.E.2d at 793.
33 Id. at 843–44, 835 S.E.2d at 791.
34 Id. at 844, 835 S.E.2d at 792.
35 Id. at 843–44, 835 S.E.2d at 791.
36 352 Ga. App. 858, 836 S.E.2d 114 (2019).
37 Id. at 858, 836 S.E.2d at 115–16.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 859, 836 S.E.2d at 116.
40 Id. at 864, 836 S.E.2d at 119.
30
31
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decision on Avis’s argument that it could not be held vicariously liable
when CSYG and Gebremichael were found not liable by the jury. 41
The case of Mannion & Mannion, Inc. v. Mendez 42 involved an
accident caused by Loren Blunkall (Blunkall), who worked for Mannion
& Mannion, Inc. (Mannion) as a mechanic. Blunkall did not have a set
lunch period, and he often went to lunch with a co-worker who lived
across the street from Mannion’s lot. Before he would leave for lunch, he
would tell the other employees working in the office that he was headed
out to get lunch. Mannion did have a time clock, but Blunkall did not
always clock in and out for lunch. On the day of the accident, Mannion’s
employees heard Blunkall say he was leaving for lunch. As he was
leaving, Blunkall pulled into the intersection and struck Jesus Mendez’s
(Mendez) motorcycle, knocking Mendez off the bike and injuring him. 43
Mendez sued Blunkall for negligence, adding Mannion as a defendant
under a theory of vicarious liability. Mannion moved for summary
judgment, arguing that it could not be liable because Blunkall was not
acting in the scope of his employment when he collided with Mendez, but
the Liberty County State Court denied Mannion’s motion. Mannion filed
for interlocutory review and asserted that the trial court erred in denying
its summary judgment motion because all of the evidence showed that
Blunkall was on his lunch break and not running an errand for Mannion
at the time of the accident. 44 In reversing the trial court, the court of
appeals agreed with Mannion. 45 Since Blunkall was on his lunch break,
the court of appeals held that Blunkall was not acting within the scope
of his employment at the time of the accident as a matter of law, and
thus, Mannion was entitled to summary judgment. 46
In Carnegay v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 47 Tyrone Carnegay (Carnegay)
was shopping for groceries at Walmart. After he paid for the items he
purchased, he thought he had been overcharged. Carnegay returned to
the produce aisle and then planned to go back to the cashier for a refund.
However, Carnegay decided not to pursue the overpayment. Instead, he
walked through the store toward the exit. 48
Ariana Boyd (Boyd), a Walmart loss prevention officer, noticed
Carnegay put the tomato in the bag and then walk toward the exit. Boyd
did not know whether Carnegay had paid for the tomato, so Boyd
Id.
355 Ga. App. 28, 842 S.E.2d 334 (2020).
43 Id. at 29, 842 S.E.2d at 337.
44 Id. at 30, 842 S.E.2d at 337.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 33, 842 S.E.2d at 339.
47 353 Ga. App. 656, 839 S.E.2d 176 (2020).
48 Id. at 657, 839 S.E.2d at 179.
41
42
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informed Trevor King (King), an off-duty police officer, that she thought
Carnegay might be shoplifting. As Carnegay approached the door,
Carnegay saw Boyd, but she did not speak to him or identify herself as a
Walmart employee. Carnegay then encountered King, who was standing
directly in front of him. King ordered Carnegay to get on the ground and
placed Carnegay under arrest for obstruction for failing to comply with
King’s instructions. King then grabbed his baton and struck Carnegay a
total of seven times, breaking his leg. 49
Carnegay sued Walmart Stores, Inc. (Walmart), Boyd, and King for
battery and false imprisonment. Carnegay argued that Walmart was
vicariously liable for the torts of Boyd and King. Carnegay, Walmart, and
Boyd moved for summary judgment. Fulton County State Court granted
Walmart and Boyd’s motion, but denied Carnegay’s cross motion for
summary judgment, which led to Carnegay’s appeal. 50
The court of appeals thought it was clear that King was acting only
as an off-duty police officer when he committed the acts of battery against
Carnegay. 51 Before hitting Carnegay with the baton, King placed
Carnegay under arrest for obstruction, which is purely a function of a
police officer, not an employee. 52 In support, the court cited Page v. CFJ
Properties, 53 which held that “’[i]n cases involving off-duty police officers
working for private employers, . . . the employer escapes liability if the
officer was performing police duties which the employer did not direct
when the cause of action arose.’” 54 However, the court held that “whether
King was acting as a police officer or at the behest of Walmart present[ed]
close factual questions that must be resolved by the jury.” 55 As to Boyd,
it is undisputed that Boyd is a Walmart employee and that any action
she took against Carnegay was within the scope of her employment. 56
Enough factual issues remained on the issue of whether Boyd directed
King to detain Carnegay that the court felt summary judgment was not
appropriate for the false imprisonment claim against Boyd. 57

Id.
Id. at 656–58, 839 S.E.2d at 178–79.
51 Id. at 660, 839 S.E.2d at 180–81.
52 Id.
53 259 Ga. App. 812, 813, 578 S.E.2d 522 (2003) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
54 Carnegay, 353 Ga. App. at 659, 839 S.E.2d at 180 (quoting Page v. CFJ Properties,
259 Ga. App. 812, 813, 578 S.E.2d 522 (2003)).
55 Id. at 661, 839 S.E.2d at 181.
56 Id. at 664, 839 S.E.2d at 183.
57 Id.
49
50
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III. BUSINESS TORTS
A. Negligent Hiring
Under O.C.G.A § 34-7-20, 58 “the employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency.” 59 To sustain an action for negligent hiring,
the plaintiff must prove the employer hired an employee whom “the
employer knew or should have known posed a risk of harm to others
where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the employee’s ‘tendencies’ or
propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained
by the plaintiff.” 60
In Avis Rent A Car System, LLC v. Smith, 61 Adrienne Danielle Smith
(Smith) was seriously injured when she was struck by a sport utility
vehicle that had been stolen from Avis’ car rental lot in downtown
Atlanta by former employee, Byron Perry (Perry). Smith sued Avis Rent
A Car System, LLC, Avis Budget Group, Inc., and Peter Duca, a regional
security manager for Avis Budget Group, as well as CSYG, Inc. (CSYG),
the operator of the downtown Avis location, and Yonas Gebremichael
(Gebremichael), CSYG's owner for negligent hiring and retention. After
a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for Smith in the amount of $47
million. Avis, CSYG, and Gebremichael filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The
trial court denied the motions. Avis, CSYG, and Gebremichael then
appealed the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 62
On appeal, the court of appeals held that Perry was not acting under
color of employment when he committed his criminal acts, so CSYG and
Gebremichael were entitled to judgment on Smith's negligent hiring and
retention claims. 63 The court based its decision on two prior decisions
from the court of appeals, Herrin Business Products v. Ergle, 64 and Lear
Siegler v. Stegall, 65 which stood for the proposition that “’to be actionable,
the [employee's] tortious act must occur during the [employee's] working
hours or while the employee is acting under color of employment. An
employer is shielded from liability for those torts his employee commits
O.C.G.A § 34-7-20 (2008).
O.C.G.A § 34-7-20.
60 Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
61 353 Ga. App. 24, 836 S.E.2d 100 (2019).
62 Id. at 24, 836 S.E.2d at 102.
63 Id. at 28, 836 S.E.2d at 105.
64 254 Ga. App. 713, 718 (4), 563 S.E.2d 442 (2002) (negligent retention).
65 184 Ga. App. 27, 360 S.E.2d 619 (1987) (negligent hiring).
58
59
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on the public in general.’” 66 As such, Smith could not prevail on her claim
for negligent hiring against CSYG and Gebremichael. 67
B. Interference with Business Relations
In Griffin v. Turner, 68 Gary Daniel Griffin (Griffin) brought an action
against Dennis R. Turner (Turner), his neighbor, for tortious interference
with contractual and business relations. 69 The court of appeals held that
a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations will not be
defeated even if there is no contractual employment relationship, and the
employee has resigned from the employment. 70
Griffin and Turner had a disagreement about the boundary line
between their properties, which led to Turner taking multiple actions
against Griffin related to his employment and his landscaping business.
Griffin worked as a photographer for Strawbridge Studios, a company
that provided photography services to public school systems. In April
2015, Turner called the offices of Strawbridge Studios, identified himself
as a concerned parent, complained about Griffin’s past drug arrests, and
threatened further action if Griffin’s employment was not “dealt” with.
Griffin was then asked to resign. Additionally, Turner reached out to
some of Griffin’s landscaping clients and made disparaging comments
about him, which caused Griffin to lose customers. Griffin then filed a
lawsuit against Turner alleging interference with contractual and
business relations and Turner moved for summary judgment, which was
granted by the Richmond County Superior Court, and Griffin appealed. 71
The court of appeals rejected Turner’s arguments that Griffin could
not pursue claims for tortious interference with contractual relations
relating to Griffin’s employment with Strawbridge Studios based on the
fact that there was no employment agreement. 72 The court stated that
even though the relationship is an at-will relationship, such a
relationship may give rise to contractual rights that receive protection
from third-party interference. 73 Whether contractual rights existed was
a question for the jury, and the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on that claim. 74 Turner further argued that Griffin could not
66 Smith, 353 Ga. App. at 28, 836 S.E.2d at 105 (quoting Herrin, 254 Ga. App. at 718,
563 SE.2d at 446).
67 Id. at 30, 836 S.E.2d at 106.
68 350 Ga. App. 694, 830 S.E.2d 239 (2019).
69 Id. at 694, 830 S.E.2d at 241.
70 Id. at 697–98, 830 S.E.2d at 243.
71 Id. at 695–97, 830 S.E.2d at 241–42.
72 Id. at 698, 830 S.E.2d at 243.
73 Id. at 697–98, 830 S.E.2d at 243.
74 Id. at 698, 830 S.E.2d at 243.
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prove his claim of tortious interference with business relations because
he resigned from Strawbridge Studios. 75 The court of appeals stated that,
“[a] jury could find that Turner’s interference hindered Griffin’s
performance of his employment duties and made them more difficult,
ultimately resulting in his resignation.” 76
IV. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
A.

Georgia Whistleblower Act

Under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA), 77 “no public employer
shall retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a
government agency.” 78 To make out a prima facie case, plaintiffs must
establish four elements:
(1) [They were] employed by a public employer;
(2) [They] made a protected disclosure or objection;
(3) [They] suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) There is some causal relation between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. 79

In City of Pendergrass v. Rintoul, 80 the court of appeals examined a
claim brought by two public employees, Katherine Rintoul (Rintoul), who
was the City Clerk for the City of Pendergrass (Pendergrass) from
January 2005 to July 2009, and William Garner (Garner) who was a
lieutenant with the Pendergrass police department from January 2005
to September 2009. In June 2009, Rintoul and Garner gathered evidence
which they believed showed misuse of public tax monies, misuse of city
equipment, bribery, and employment of an undocumented immigrant.
After presenting the evidence to the mayor, each individual was shunned
and experienced retaliation from other city officials. Ultimately, Rintoul
was terminated and Garner resigned. 81
Id.
Id.
77 Ga. H.R. Bill 642, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.G.A § 45-1-4 (Supp. 2014)); see
also Colon v. Fulton Cnty., 294 Ga. 93, 93, 751 S.E.2d 307, 308 (2013).
78 O.C.G.A § 45-1-4(d)(2).
79 Albers v. Georgia Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 330 Ga. App. 58, 61, 766
S.E.2d 520, 523 (2014); See Forrester v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Serv., 308 Ga. App. 716, 722,
708 S.E.2d 660, 666 (2011).
80 354 Ga. App. 618, 841 S.E.2d 399 (2020).
81 Id. at 618–20, 841 S.E.2d at 401–02.
75
76
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Rintoul and Garner then brought suit against Pendergrass for
violations of the GWA. Following a trial, a jury awarded a verdict of $1
million to Rintoul and Garner. Pendergrass sought appeal of the Jackson
County Superior Court’s denial of its request for a directed verdict, and
that the jury award was arbitrary and not supported by the evidence. 82
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(4), 83 the court of appeals held that
Rintoul and Garner did prove that Pendergrass was a public employer. 84
Rintoul and Garner were able to show that Pendergrass received a
unique value from the State of Georgia, which was of a type that only
public employers would be eligible to receive. 85 For example, “the City
availed itself of a high speed internet line made available and paid for by
the State of Georgia.” 86 The court also held that the trial court did not err
in denying Pendergrass’s motion for a directed verdict based on Garner’s
retaliation claim. 87 The court of appeals held that by definition under the
GWA, 88 Garner experienced numerous instances of retaliation. 89 For
example, Garner suffered verbal abuse, was prohibited from taking his
patrol car home, suffered loss of rank and pay, and faced isolation from
his colleagues. 90
V. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
A. “Blue Penciling”
In 2011, Georgia voters approved a constitutional amendment
changing the law on restrictive covenants. 91 Under the amendment,
Georgia courts focus their analysis on whether a covenant restricts future
employment in a reasonable manner. 92
The amendment also allows courts to blue pencil agreements to avoid
the invalidation of the entire agreement. 93 In order to have agreements
subject to blue penciling, employers should have employees with pre 2011

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(4) (2012).
84 Rintoul, 354 Ga. App. at 621, 841 S.E.2d at 403.
85 Id. at 623, 841 S.E.2d at 404.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 624, 841 S.E.2d at 405.
88 O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5).
89 Rintoul, 354 Ga. App. at 626, 841 S.E.2d at 406.
90 Id.
91 GA. CONST. ART. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3).
92 GA. CONST. ART. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3); see also O.C.G.A § 13-8-50 (2010 & Supp. 2012).
93 Vulcan Steel Structures, Inc. v. McCarty, 329 Ga. App. 220, 220, 764 S.E.2d 458, 459
(2014).
82
83

160

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

agreements sign new ones. 94 Under Georgia law, continued employment
can be sufficient consideration for an at-will employee to sign a new
agreement. 95 For any employees who have already signed an agreement
with a defined term of employment, employers must offer additional
consideration in order for the agreement to constitute a valid new
agreement. 96
In Belt Power, LLC v. Reed, 97 the court of appeals dealt with a matter
of first impression dealing with the scope and application of Georgia’s
Restrictive Covenants Act. 98 Belt Power, LLC (Belt Power) sought review
of the trial court’s final summary judgment order declaring void and
unenforceable various restrictive covenants in their contracts with
former employees, Steve Reed (Reed) and Jeffrey Harrington
(Harrington), and dismissing their counterclaims for breach of those
restrictive covenants. Reed and Harrington were territory managers for
Belt Power. In 2008, Reed and Harrington bought minority equity shares
of the company in accordance to an “LLC Interest Purchase and
Restriction Agreement.” In 2014, Reed and Harrington, in separate
transactions, sold their shares back to Belt Power pursuant to a
“Confidentiality, Non-Competition, and Non-Solicitation Agreement.”
Reed left Belt Power in 2015, and Harrington left Belt Power in 2017. In
2017, they formed Sitka Belt, LLC and brought an action for a
declaratory judgment stating that the agreements were not enforceable
and seeking a permanent injunction barring Belt Power from attempting
to enforce the agreements. 99
The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred by analyzing
the enforceability of the restrictive covenants under common law instead
of Georgia’s Restrictive Covenants Act. 100 However, since the trial court
made an alternative holding that even if the Act applied, the provisions
were unreasonable and overly broad, and it would not blue pencil the
provisions, the court of appeals determined that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. 101 The court noted that the Act contained the word
“may” when referring to the court’s ability to modify covenants that are
unreasonable. 102 Since “[t]he word ‘may’ . . . usually implies some degree
Id.
Thomas v. Costal Industrial Services, Inc., 214 Ga. 832, 832, 108 S.E.2d 328, 329
(1959).
96 Glisson v. Global Sec. Services, L.L.C., 287 Ga. App. 640, 641–642, 653 S.E.2d 85, 86–
87 (2007).
97 354 Ga. App. 289, 840 S.E.2d 765 (2020).
98 Id. at 289, 840 S.E.2d at 767 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50).
99 Id. at 289–91, 840 S.E.2d at 767.
100 Id. at 293–94, 840 S.E.2d at 769.
101 Id. at 294, 840 S.E.2d at 769.
102 Id. at 294–95, 840 S.E.2d at 770.
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of discretion[,]” the court of appeals held that it is within a trial court’s
discretion on whether to “blue pencil” an overly broad restrictive
covenant. 103
B. Defenses to Restrictive Covenants
Yash Solutions, LLC v. New York Global Consultants Corp. 104 centered
around a dispute involving New York Global Consultants Corp. (NYG),
who was a provider of information-technology (IT) consulting, software
development, and project-management services. Yash Solutions, LLC
(Yash) was a similar IT consulting and business-solutions firm. Both
companies recruited and screened consultants to place in other
companies. NYG and Yash entered into a Master Supplier Agreement
(MSA), wherein NYG would supply IT consultants to Yash, and Yash
would place those consultants with clients. The MSA contained a
non-compete provision, restricting NYG from providing the same or
similar service as Yash to specific clients listed in an addendum to the
MSA. Yash placed two NYG consultants, Rathi and Pinto, with one of the
clients named in the addendum, EMC, between March 2013, and
February 2015. 105
Once Rathi’s placement concluded, Yash was told that it could find a
new placement for him with EMC, but Rathi declined placement with
EMC. Rathi had already been placed on a new project with EMC. In
December of 2014, Yash sent a letter to NYG, alleging that NYG had
breached the non-compete provision by placing Rathi with EMC directly.
However, Yash continued to place NYG consultants with their clients.
NYG then filed a complaint in March of 2015. Both parties filed claims
and moved for summary judgment, but the trial court denied NYG’s
claim for summary judgment as to Yash’s counterclaim alleging that
NYG breached the non-compete provision. A jury later found that Yash’s
actions had amounted to a waiver of the non-compete provision. 106
On appeal, Yash argued that the jury’s finding of a waiver was not
supported by the evidence presented at trial. 107 The court of appeals
noted that the issue was a question of fact for a jury to decide, and
because there was some evidence to support the jury verdict, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 108

103 Id. at 294–95, 840 S.E.2d at 769–70 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677,
796 (IV) (B), 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983)).
104 352 Ga. App. 127, 834 S.E.2d 126 (2019).
105 Id. at 128–29, 834 S.E.2d at 129–30.
106 Id. at 129–31, 834 S.E.2d at 130–31.
107 Id. at 132, 834 S.E.2d at 132.
108 Id. at 135, 834 S.E.2d at 134–35.
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Fortress Investment Group, LLC v. Holsinger 109 involved a dispute
between Fortress Investment Group, LLC (Fortress), an asset
management firm, and Joel Holsinger (Holsinger) who began working for
Fortress in 2008. Holsinger signed an initial employment agreement, but
later signed a new employment agreement with Fortress on January 15,
2010. Several restrictive covenants were included within the new
employment agreement. Holsinger resigned from Fortress in March
2018. After resigning from Fortress, Holsinger met with an asset
management firm named Ares Operations LLC. Fortress sent letters to
Ares Operations LLC alleging that Holsinger had violated the restrictive
covenants in his employment agreement, and that if Ares Operations
LLC were to hire Holsinger, it would risk legal exposure. 110
Holsinger filed suit in Fulton County Superior Court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenants were invalid and
unenforceable, and injunctive relief barring Fortress from enforcing or
threatening to enforce the restrictive covenants. On February 5, 2019,
Fortress filed an “emergency motion” asking the superior court to compel
Holsinger to submit his electronic devices for forensic imaging and to
return allegedly confidential information. The superior court determined
that no emergency existed and denied the motion. 111
On appeal, Fortress contended that the trial court erred in refusing
to consider the unrefuted evidence of Holsinger’s “unclean hands.” 112
However, the court of appeals determined that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ruled that Holsinger could not have unclean
hands from his failure to abide by restrictive covenants that were
unenforceable. 113 The court of appeals noted that the trial court correctly
considered whether Holsinger had unclean hands, and concluded that
even if Holsinger violated the agreement, that still would not make any
previously unenforceable post termination restraints now enforceable
going forward. 114
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the issues arising under Georgia law
are becoming progressively more challenging each year, with the growing
overlap between state and federal issues, as well as growing state
regulations, adding to the challenge. Regardless of whether a practitioner
specializes in state, federal, administrative, or other matters pertaining
354 Ga. App. 405, 841 S.E.2d 55 (2020).
Id. at 406–07, 841 S.E.2d at 57–58.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 408, 841 S.E.2d at 59.
113 Id.
114Id. at 408–09, 841 S.E.2d at 59.
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to labor and employment, it is important to recognize and stay abreast of
the ever-evolving trends, policies, cases, and state and federal guidelines.
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